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I.  INTRODUGTION 
In this article the nature of the European unemployment problem is 
analysed. We concentrate on both the demand- and supply side sour- 
ces of the persistent unemployment in Europe. Al1 too often econo- 
mists have emphasised one of the two sources at the exclusion of the 
other. As wil1 be shown in this article both demand and supply are at 
the core of the unemployment problem in Europe. 
II. DIAGNOSTICS OF  THE EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT: 
THE CONTRAST WITH THE  US 
Much has been said about the differences in the functioning of  the 
labour markets in Europe and the US. These differences are wel1 sum- 
inarised in the following graph (see Fig 1). First, during recessions 
American unemployment quite often increases substantially, even 
more so than European unemployment. This is the case, for example, 
during the recessions of 1974-76 and 1980-82. It is less so during the 
recession of  1991-93'. However, during the upturn of  economic ac- 
tivity, the American unemployment always declines to its pre-reces- 
sion level. As a result, the long term trend in the American unern- 
ployment rate is flat. In contrast, although the European unemploy- 
ment rate typically increases less than the American one during the 
recession, it never declines to its pre-recession level. As a result, the 
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3  95 long term trend is upwards. This mtchet effect is quite worrisome. It 
appears that each time Europe is hit by a shock (say, a recession) un- 
employment goes up, while when the economy improves unemploy- 
ment stays put or goes down only partially. Thus, temporary distur- 
bances like recessions have permanent effects on European unem- 
ployrnent. This feature is totally absent from the US data. 
The ratchet effect in the European unemployment is particularly 
strilting during the 1990s. We see that European unemployment in- 
creased by close to 40% during the decade. This increase occurred es- 
sentially during two years, i.e. from 1991 to 1993 when unemploy- 
ment went from 8 % to I1 %. after  that, it pretty much remained un- 
changed despite a recovery of economic activity. 
How can we explain this troublesome European phenomenon where- 
by each shock seems to bring the unemployment rate to a higher lev- 
el? In what follows we wil1 concentrate our attention on what hap- 
pened during the 1990s. The analysis can, however, easily be extend- 
ed to the previous episodes of rising European unemployment. 
One story about the increase in unemployment in the European 
Union during the 1990s is that it is wholly due to labour market rigid- 
ities and the high taxation of labour. In this view, the European un- 
employment is a supply side (micro-economic) problem disconnect- 
ed from the demand side and, in particular, from the process of dis- 
inflation that was pursued during the decade in order to comply to 
the Maastricht convergence criteria. This is now the consensus view 
of the European monetary policy makers. The latter consider the un- 
employment problem to be totally outside the realm of their respon- 
sibility. 
This story, however, is quite unsatisfactory. It fails to explain the 
exact dynamics of the increase in unemployment in the European 
Union. As mentioned earlier (see Figure l), the increase in unem- 
ployment was very much concentrated in just a few years. It is diffi- 
cult to see how labour market rigidities and taxation of labour, which 
have not changed much during the period, can be held responsible for 
the sudden surge of unemployment during the early 1990s. FIGURE  1 
Unenzploynzent in EU, US and Japan 
So~~rce:  Europeail Commission, European Economy 
A more satisfactory hypothesis is one that takes int0 account both 
demand and supply side phenomena (micro and macro-economic phe- 
nomena). We first formulate the hypothesis in very genera1 terms. In 
the next sections we discuss it in more detail. The hypothesis can be 
formulated as follows. The recession of the early 1990s  was mainly due 
to a decline in aggregate demand. This led to an increase in unem- 
ployment in al1 industrial countries. The difference between the EU 
and the Anglo-Saxon countries is that the lack of labour market flexi- 
bility in the former countries prevented the rate of  unemployment 
from declining subsequently. Put differently, the labour market rigid- 
ities in the EU transform temporary cyclical disturbances into per- 
manent increases in unemployment. This feature is mostly absent from 
the movements in the unemployment rate in the United States. 
III. DEMAND POLICIES DURING THE 1990s 
In this section we study the nature of the inonetary and fiscal policies 
in the EU-11 and compare it with the US policy mix during the 1990s. 
(We have chosen the EU-11, i.e. the group of EU  countries that is like- 
ly to start EMU on January 1, 1999, because this group has followed denland policies very much geared towards adhering to the Maas- 
tricht-mandated convergence criteria). 
Figure 2 provides some evideiice concerning tlie conduct of morze- 
taryyolicies. We present and compare the real short-term interest ra- 
tes in the EU-11 and in the US during the first half of the 1990s. It is 
now generally accepted that the short-term real interest rate is the best 
indicator of the stance of monetary policies. We observe a great con- 
trast between the US and the EU-11's conduct of monetaiy policies. 
During the US recession which occurred in 1990-91, the US mone- 
taiy authorities  were willing to let the short term real interest rate drop 
to 1  to 2 %. In contrast, in the EU-11 tlie monetary authorities main- 
tained real interest rates wel1 above 5 % throughout the recession. 
This policy of keeping historically high short term real interest ra- 
tes during a recession was very much influenced by the German posi- 
tion in the EMS. During the early 1990s, the German inonetary au- 
thorities fought a battle against "excessive" inflation (4 % a year), whi- 
le most of the other EMS-countries decided to continue to peg to the 
strong DM and were thereby dragged by Germany int0 applying a po- 
licy of  strong monetary restriction in the midst of their most serious 
post-war recession. 
Whatever the institutional reasons, one can conclude that the EU- 
11 followed significantly more restrictive monetary policies than the 
US during the first half of tlie 1990s. What about fiscal policies? FIGURE 2 
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Figure 3 shows the structural budget deficits as measured by  the 
OECD for the EU-11 and for the US. This is the deficit corrected for 
business cycle influences, and therefore measures the effect of  dis- 
cretionary policies on the government budgets. It can be considered 
as a good indicator of the nature of the budgetary policies. When the 
lines in Figure 4 increase, one can say that the authorities followed 
restrictive fiscal policies (by raising taxes or reducing spending). From Figure 3 one observes that the EU-11  countries started to ap- 
ply policies of fiscal restriction from 1991 on. They continued to do 
so throughout the 1990s and accelerated tlieir efforts in 1996-97 at 
the approach of the Maastricht deadline. The US applied similar re- 
strictive fiscal policies througliout the 1990s, despite the absence of 
an explicit institutional frameworlc a la Maastricht. 
FIGURE 3 
Strcictural budget deficit (percei~t  of  GDP) 
Soi!i.ce. OECD. Ec»riomic Outlook 
Comparing the monetaiy and fiscal policies of  the EU-11 and the 
US during the first half of the 1990s, we coiiclude that the EU-11 po- 
licy mix can be characterised by monetary and fiscal restriction. The 
US on the other hand, followed quite a different policy mix. It com- 
bined fiscal restriction with monetary ease. Thus, the difference bet- 
ween the EU-11 and the US was rnonetaiy policy. Both followed si- 
milarly restrictive fiscal policies. Tlieir monetary policies, however, 
were very different, with the EU-11 applying monetary tightness and 
the US monetary ease during the first half of the 1990s. Al1 this helps 
to explain why European economic growth during the 1990s dropped 
to about half its level of the 1980s. No such growth deceleration was observed in the US. Tnie conclude that the European demand policies 
pursued during the first half of tl-ie 1990s are responsible for a signi- 
ficant decline in output and are therefore also partially responsible 
for the increase in uiiemployment whicln was very inuch concentrated 
during the period of restrictive demand policies. Hn  (De Grauwe (1997) 
more econometrie evidence is provided to substantiate this conclu- 
sion). In this sense it can be said that the defiationary demand poli- 
ties produced a significant number of the European uneinployed. The 
labour marltet rigidities then did the rest and condemned a large part 
of tliein to remain unemployed. We analyse these labour market rigi- 
dities in more detail in the next section. 
IV.  EEUROPEAN UNEMPEOYMENT AND THE SUPPLY SIDE 
Demand side shoclts alone cannot explain the persistent and Increas- 
ing unemployment in Europe. We need the supply side too, and more 
in particular the rigidities in the labour market to understand the na- 
ture of the problem. The  rigidities that matter have recently been stud- 
ied in detail by Steve Nickel (1997). They are the unemployment ben- 
efit schemes, the centralised wage bargaining systems, minimum wag- 
es coupled with the high level of taxation on labour2.  It is important 
to realise that these rigidities perforin a social function. Most of them 
explicitly or implicitly aim at providingprotection of  the income of  those 
who have a job'.  ket us analyse some of these. 
Minimum wages protect the worker (the insider) against the unem- 
ployed (the outsider) who would undercut the wage of the wsrker. 
At the same time minimum wages protect the profits of  the firm 
against the low wage coinpetitioii of other firms. It is clear that open- 
ing up marltets towards trade from low wage countries makes tliis 
kind of protection less effective. 
e  Unemploynzent benefits protect worlters froin too Iarge an income 
loss when they become unemployed. At the same time, however, 
generous uneinployment benefits also protect the income of the in- 
siders against competition by the outsiders. The reason is that gen- 
erous unemployment benefits lead the unemployed to reduce their 
efforts at finding a job. As a result, the supply of labour is reduced. 
This has the effect of reducing the downward pressure on wages that 
normally would accompany an increase in unemployment. e  Centralised wage bargaining, by fixing the wage structure for al1 work- 
ers in an industry (or even country), also reduces competition in the 
labour market and protects the income of those who have a job. 
In combination with the high taxation of labour these income pro- 
tection schemes make the European labour markets very vulnerable 
to shocks (e.g. a recession). We illustrate this by a stylised example of 
the combination of unemployment benefits and the taxation of labour. 
FIGURE 4 
Gross and net wage asfiiizction of income level 
This wil1 allow us to construct a curve that summarises the essence 
of the supply side problems in Europe. 
We start from the well-ltnown phenomenon of the tax wedge, i.e. 
tbe differente between the gross and net wages which increase with 
the level of income. We illustrate the phenomenon in Figure 4. Ir rep- 
resents the situatioii of a hypotheticai European economy where the 
gross wage cost of the firm quicltly moves to twice the net wage for 
the worker. We wil1 also assume that income and ski11 levels are per- 
fectly correlated. 
ket US now introduce unemployment benefits (which we arbitrari- 
ly set at 150 for everybody who is unemployed). We subtract this nurn- 
ber from the net wage of the worker. What we now obtain we cal1 the net earnings from  working. That is, it represents the extra remunera- 
tion the worker obtains for his work effort above what he would get if 
he did not work. We show these numbers in Figure 5: 
FIGURE 5 
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We observe the well-known plienomenon that tlie remuneration for 
work effort is extremely low for low-skilled workers. This is the result 
of the combination of  unemployment benefits and high taxation. In 
Figure 5 we have represented the case, often observed in European 
countries, that the net remuneration from working is negative for the 
lowest skill. This often happens when unemployed obtain additional 
benefits, e.g. rent subsidies, free public transportation, etc. 
The last step in the analysis consists in constructing a curve which 
is the net earnings from working as a percent of gross wage cost. We 
show this curve in Figure 6. 
It has a strongly non-linear shape. Take the first skill level for which 
this percentage is positive (when the number is negative rational work- 
ers wil1 simply not take a job). This is skill level 1  with a percentage of 
15 %. This means that when the firm pays 100 to this worker, the lat- 
ter's net earnings from his work is only 15. The latter number can be 
interpreted as the remuneration society gives to this worker for his- 
decision to work. The firm, however pays 100 to this Same worker. FIGURE 6 
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Profit maximising firms will make sure that the productivity of  this 
worker is at least 100. Otherwise the worker will simply not keep his 
job. Thus, the firm expects an effort from the worker worth at least 
100. The worker receives for this effort only 15. There is tl-ius a huge 
distortion between the value that the firms wants to extract from the 
worker and the effort (measured in money terms) that the worker wil1 
be willing to spend on the job. We can also cal1 this distortion the dif- 
ference in valuation of the same work by the firm and the worker. In 
this example, the worker values the job he is performing as a very smal1 
fraction of the value (the cost) the firm attaches to this work. This dis- 
tortion in the valuation of the same work by worlters and firms is at 
the core of  the European unemployment problem. In Figure 6 we 
present this distortion graphically as a function of the income level of 
the worker. 
Figure 6 shows that the distortion is the highest for low income (low 
skill) workers. As the income level increases the net earnings workers 
obtain froin their decision to work increases relative to the wage cost 
for the firm. As a result, the distance between the value attached by 
the firm to the workers effort and the value the worker attaches to his 
effort narrows. The distortion declines. There is a point where the dis- tortion increases again due to the influence of the progressivity of tax- 
ation that is present in a typical European economy. 
What is the effect of this difference in valuation of the Same work 
by the firm and tlie worker? Clearly, the low skilled worker has a very 
smal1 incentive to supply his services in the (official) labour market. 
In many European countries the net earnings from work for the low- 
est skill worker are clou9 to Tere, so that thiq work tends to disappear. 
and to sliow up in tlie unemployment statistics4.  There is thus no mys- 
tery in the fact that a very large fraction of European unemployed are 
unskilled. In this connection, much bas been said about the bias in 
technological change against the low skilled workers. Empirica] evi- 
dence in favour of this hypothesis kas not been stronig (see S. Nickell 
(1997)). A much more satisfactory explanation is the one provided 
here: the income protection system together with taxation has creat- 
ed a stroilg bias against the low-skilled labour. 
We can now make the link with the analysis of the deinand side of 
the previous section to explain the European phensmenon of perma- 
nent increases in unemployment with each business cycle shock.Sup- 
pose that a downturn in economic activity reduces employment uni- 
formly for al1 skill levels. The workers who loose their job, had accu- 
mulated skills while working. Part of these skills is now lost. As a re- 
su?t,  each new unemployed moves down in the sliill ladder. Let us as- 
sume thar each of  them moves down one step in terms of  our Fig- 
ure 6. For most of the high- and medium skilled workers this does nol 
change the incentive to look for a new job. At the Iow end, however, 
the do\wnward movement radically changes these incentives. The less 
sliilled they are, the stronger the "downward  slide" into the unern- 
ploynlent trap that the protective systern bas created. They become 
permanently unemployed. When fhe economic activity picks up again, 
hhey cannot "climb up the curve" againí. 
Note that we can phrace this effect also from the point of view of 
fhe firnl. We can ask the question what the gross wage is the firm would 
Biave to pay in order to ensure that ihe worker has a financial iiicen- 
tive to how supply his services. In order to answer that question let us 
assume that the median income worker Pias sufficiently strong incen- 
tives to supply his labour services. In Figure G this is the worker in the 
incorne categsry Iabelled 9. We  then compute the gross wage cost 
needed to match the supply incentives of the median worker. The re- 
sult is given in Figure 7. We observe that this hypothetical gross wage 
cost PS  approximately 70 % above the gross wage cost the firm pays out. (Note that Figure 7 we assume the Same tax rates and unemploy- 
ment benefits as in Figure 6). This gap between the hypothetical and 
the actual wage cost declines sharply with the skill level. 
If we assume that the actual wage cost paid out by the firm reflects 
the productivity of the worker, we can interpret Figure 7 as fellows". 
For low levels of skill, the firm has to bear a wage cost which is signif- 
icantly above labour productivity in order to make these low-ski11 jobs 
attractive to the worker. As Figure 7 suggests, for low skill workers 
this extra wage cost above productivity reaches 60 to 70 9%.  A firm that 
would want to attract a worker who has lost his job would have to pay 
a wage exceeding the (reduced) productivity of  the worker so as to 
give hini a net wage that is high enough to give him the incentive to 
take on this new job. Most firms will not want to do this. Thus, the 
worker may perceive the problem in a very different way. Me observes 
that no firm is willing to provide him with a job that will give him a 
net income worth doing the extra effort. Note that in this interpre- 
tation, the unemployment benefits together with the high taxation 
work in the Same way as minimum wages. Thus, even if  there are no 
explicit minimum wages, the combination of generous unemployment 
benefits and labour taxes create de facto minimum wages7. 
FIGURE 7 
Gross wage gap Several aspects should be noted about the mechanism described in 
the previous sections. First, as the low skilled withdraw from the la- 
beur market, their withdrawal eliminates a potential labour market 
equilibrating mechanism, i.e. a downward movement on the wage lev- 
el. Thus, we will observe considerable wage rigidity despite large scale 
uneinployment"  The existence of  considerable wage rigidity in Eu- 
rope as opposed to :he  US lnac been wel1 documented. 
Second, econometric studies looking at the correlation between un- 
employment and protective measures (such as unemployrnent bene- 
fits or minimum wages), have often failed to discover much relation. 
This has to do  with the fact that these measures are in place for a long 
time. As long as no shock occur, they do not affect unemployment 
m~ch.  Whrn shocks eccur, these ir,rusurrs sturt to "bite". 
We conclude that the existence of the distortion that we illustrated 
in Figure 4 makes it al1 but inevitable that in a labour market based 
on free contracts low skilled labour wil1 tend to disappear over time. 
The only way the employment of unskilled labour can be made profi- 
table again is by  removing the distortion. If  this is not possible, the 
government will have to take over that segment of the labour market. 
This is what is happening in Europe today. We come back to this is- 
sue in a later section. 
V.  HOW T0  DEVISE THE  RIGHT POLICIES? 
The European unemployment problem can also be described as fol- 
lows. Negative shocks lead workers (especially low-skilled workers) 
to fa11 int0 the unemployment trap. In order to get out of this trap they 
should be pulled  and pushed  out of  it. The pulling must come from 
macro-economic policies that are sufficiently conducive to economie 
growth. We have argued that they were not sufficiently so during the 
1990s. In the next section we analyse the prospects for more stimu- 
latoiy demand policies in the future EMU. Pulling alone will howev- 
er not help, if  the unemployed are not pushed out of  the trap. Here 
labour market reform together with a reduction of the taxation on la- 
bour are the appropriate responses. They will give incentives to work- 
ers to want to be employed and to firms to want to hire the unem- 
ployed. Al1 this is well-known. There are, however, great obstacles to 
implement such policies which we discuss in section VI. VI.  RISK OF DEFLATIONARY DEMAND POLICIES IN THE 
FUTURE EMU 
Is there a risk that the authoraties of the future euro-area wil1 repeat 
the policy errors of the 1990s and pursue too deflationasy macro-eco- 
nomie policies in the euro-area? This is the question we analyse in this 
section. We first analyse monetary policies and then fiscal policies in 
the future EMU. 
A. The risk of rnonelary deflation in the future EMU 
One of the challenges confronting tlne ECB is to establish a reputa- 
ti011  of an institi.ition  rapable of produciiig low inflation  This ebal- 
lenge looms large over the future operations of the ECB. There :s  '  now 
a universal recognition in the financial anarkets that the establish- 
ment of such a strong reputation is the foremost priority of the future 
ECB. But how low wil1 inflation have to be to give the ECB the rep- 
utation it seeks? One benchmark is probably going to be the inflation 
rate that the present EU-countries likely to enter EMU in 1999, have 
achieved. hything higher than this benchmark may be interpreted 
by the market as iiisufficient to acquire a low inflation reputation. In 
table 1  we show the rates of inflation achieved in these EU-countries. 
We observe the remarkable phenomenon tliat the EU-l1 have now 
been abie to reduce their inflarion rates to less than 2 % on average. 
Should we rejoice about these successes in lowering inflation in the 
EU-11  ? The answer is  not so sure, Wo  issues arise here. First, there 
is the issue of what the inflation objective should be. Second, there is 
the question of the trade-off between inflation and output stabilisatioii. 
What should be the inflation target of the European monetary au- 
thorities? In the economic literature two arguments have been devel- 
oped recently suggesting that an inflation target of  less than 2 % is 
probably too low. First, there is a measurement problem. As was stressed 
by the Boskin report, our conventional measures of  inflation do not 
sufficiently take into account qualily improvements (See Advisory 
Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index (1996), Gordon (1996) 
and Shapiro and Wilcox (1996)). This leads to an upward bias esti- 
mated to be 1.1  % on average in the US. Second, the existente of mon- 
ey illusion leads to a situation in which real wage flexibility is enhanced 
when there is some inflation. In a dynamic world some sectors need 
to reduce real wages, others to increase them. When inflation is zero, real wage reduction can only occur through iiominal wage declines. 
This is made difficult in the presence of money illusion. Recently k- 
erlof et al. (1996) has estimated that an inflation rate of  4 to 2 % will 
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Al1 this (quality bias + real wage adjustments) suggests that tlie in- 
flation target the authorities should pursue is of the order of 2 to 3 % 
a year. Seen from this perspective, the iiiflation rate achieved in the 
EU-11 in 1997 seems to be too low. Hf  this inflation rate wil1 be used 
as a benchmark to judge the performance of the future ECB, there is 
a good chance that the ECB will target too low an inflation rate for 
some time. 
The second issue that arises is the trade-off between inflation and 
output stabilisation. The Maastricht Treaty states that the primary ob- 
jective of  the ECB is to ensure price stability. The Treaty, however, 
also stipulates that the ECB should support the genera1 economic ob- 
jectives of  the Community, provided these objectives do not endan- 
ges price stability. One of these objectives is the maintenance of high employment. The Treaty, thus recognises a clear hierarchy in the ob- 
jectives to be pursued by the ECB, in which price stability overrides 
the other econoinic objectives. Nevertheless, the Treaty does recog- 
nise the responsibility of the ECB as far as employment is concerned. 
Mow the future ECB will be filling out this mandate is difficult to 
predict. Today the general "discours" of European central bankers is 
that the high European unemployment has nothing to do with mon- 
etaiy policies, and that it has everything to do with supply side prob- 
lems and labour market rigidities. Our analysis of the deflationary pro- 
cess of the 1990s suggests that this view is wrong. We argued that the 
excessive monetary deflation during 1992-93 contributed to the large 
increase in unemployrnent during these two years. Aii increase tliat 
subsequentby attained a permanent character mainly because of the 
rigidities in the European labour markets. Thus, the right view about 
the responsibilities of the European monetary authorities is that tbey 
should tiy to mitigate recessions so as to avoid excessive increases in 
unemployment, which subsequently have a tendency of becoming per- 
manent. The right view, therefore, recognises that the European un- 
employment problem is the result of demaiid and supply, and there- 
fore requires action both on the demand and the supply side. The Eu- 
ropean monetary authorities cannot just pull out of the game and leave 
it to other levels of government to tackle the unemployment prob- 
lem, as they have done duriiig the 1990s. 
B. The dej-lationary ejfects of the stabilitypact 
At first sight,  things look much brighter on the fiscal front. After rnany 
years of fiscal restrictions, the EU-11 countries have successfully re- 
duced their government budget deficits to the required 3 %. It ap- 
pears now in 1997 that tliey will be reaping the benefits of their bud- 
getary orthodoxy, so that they will be able to relax the budgetary tight- 
Iiess. In addition, the European business cycle is improving, reducing 
even further the need to continue applying budgetary restriction. The 
stability pact may, however, interfere in this optimistic prospect. 
The need for a stability pact had been hotly debated by  econo- 
mist~.  One of  the main points of criticism levied against this pact is 
that it wil1 rob the government budget of  its automatic stabilisers, 
thereby aggravating recessions. Against this criticism, officials have 
replied first that when the recession is severe enough (more than 2 % 
decline of  GDP) the sanctions do not apply, and second, that once the steady state of  a balanced budget is reached, the 3 % ceiling on 
the budget deficit should provide ample Ieeway for the deficit to in- 
crease during a recession (see European Commission (1997), and Buti 
(1997)). This is undoubtedly so. One problem, however, is that dur- 
ing the transition towards the steady state, new recessions are likely 
to arise, robbing the budgets of part of their automatic stabilisers. 
A more fundamental criticism against tlie stability pact is the fol- 
lowing. Whereas the Maastricht Treaty had set as a norm that the gov- 
ernment debt ratio should converge to 60 %, the stability pact has fun- 
damentally changed this norm. Instead of 60 %, the new norm for the 
debt to GDP ratio under the stability pact is O  %. This can be ex- 
plained as follows. According to the stability pact, countries have to 
avoid exceeding the limit of  3 9% for the budget deficit. In addition, 
the stability pact stipulates, quite sensibly, that this necessitates set- 
ting medium term budgetary targets which are "close-to-balance or 
in surplus", given that in a recession deficits increase automatically 
by several percentage poiilts9. This new objective of budget balance, 
if  taken seriously, implies that governments should stop borrowing. 
In other words, the government debt should remain constant. In a 
growing world, this implies that in the long run the debt1GDP ratio 
should converge to zero".  This requirement is quite a significant 
change relalive to the Maastricht norm of 60 % for the debt to GDP 
ratio1'.  Ht  has important implications, which we analyse now. 
As long as the norm was the Maastricht 60 % debt/GDP ratio, coun- 
tries that came close to it had the prospect of being able to signifi- 
cantly relax their budgetary tightness. For example, if the economy is 
growing at 5 % a year, then the deficit can be set at 3 % and at the 
Same time the debt1GDP can be stabilised at the required level of 
60 %l2.  Most countries with a high debt level had the prospect that, 
as they approached the 60 % norin, they would be able to increase 
the deficit again without endangering this norm. True, until tlie mag- 
ic 60 % was reached, these countries would have to maintain their bud- 
get deficits below 3 % so as to reach the target. But once they had 
reached it, they would be able to return to the 3 % budget deficit, 
thereby creating a budgetary "dividend" that could be used, for ex- 
ample, to face the iiicreasing cost of  financing pensions. The pros- 
pect of  being able to do this, created an expectation in many coun- 
tries witli a high debt level that there was light at the end of the tunnel. 
The operation of  the stability pact changes the nature of  this dy- 
namics. Countries wil1 not be able to relax fiscal policies when they come in the neighbourhood of the 60 % debt norm. They will have to 
continue their budgetary effort. The light in the tunnel will be a re- 
ceding one. 
One could argue, of  course, that the stability pact will not be ap- 
plied, so that olie should not worry too much about it. There is in- 
deed a good chance that it will not be put int0 practice, when govern- 
ments realise that a literal application of its precepts will lead them 
on a road of continuing deflation. In addition, there is also no serious 
scientific argument for applying a pact that, if  taken seriously, will 
force governments (who invest in infrastructure and other public goods) 
to reduce their debt ratios to zero, much in the same way as there is 
no serious argument to be made for firms who invest, to reduce their 
debt ratio to zero. 
VIH.  WOW TO  DEVISE POLICPES TO  TACKLE THE LABOUR 
MARMET RIGIDITIES IN EUROPE 
Two approaches have been followed to eliminate the unemployment 
trap that we analysed in section III. A first approach could be called 
the Anglo-Saxon one, the second will be called the continental Euro- 
pean approach. 
A.  The  Anglo-Saxon approach 
This approach consists in reducing the level of income protection. We 
represent the effect of sucli a policy in Figure 8. TNe assume that the 
unemployment benefits are reduced by half. The net earniiigs curve 
can now shift upwards. Working becomes more valuable and tlius more 
attractive for  al1 workers. Wowever, the relative improvement is the 
greatest for the low skilled workers. Hf,  like in our example, the un- 
employment benefits are reduced by half, the net earnings from work- 
ing for the lowest skilled worker are tripled. This effect is much sinall- 
er in relative terrns for higher income workers. We conclude that the 
distortion which drives out unskilled labour from the economy is con- 
siderably reduced. 
While making work more valuable for everybody, this change to- 
wards the Aiiglo-Saxon model reduces the degiree of income protec- 
tion of workers with a job. It is clear that these workers will resist such 
a change forcefully. As a result, on the European continent where the 
resistance has been the highest, governments have attempted to elim- inate the unemployment trap by other ineans, i.e. without affecting 
the degree of income protection of workers. 
B. The continental approuch 
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The country that stands out for attempting this approach is France. 
Instead of  ïeducing the uneinployment benefits, it bas introduced 
schemes aimed at subsidising Iow skill workers, in two ways. One is by 
direct subsidies. The other is by reducing the tax burden on low-skill 
workers. Tlie government budget constraint being very tight as a re- 
sult of  the Maastricht budgetary criteria, the gsvernment has com- 
pensated these direct and indirect subsidies by raising taxes on high- 
er income workers. Similar policies have been applied in countïies like 
Belgium anb  Htaly, and to a lesser degree in Germany. The effect of 
these policies has been ?-o  twist the net earnings curve. We show this 
(in an idealised way) in Figure 9: We assume that at the lower end of 
the skill distribution al1 taxes are removed. This drastically increases 
the net wage of workers, and therefore also the value of work for them. Wowever, the price of this policy is double. First, the degree of pro- 
gressivity of the total tax burden increases significantly. The reason is 
that tax rates which are now veiy low for low income workers must 
catch up to reach the "normal"  rates for income levels that are not 
too high. Second, the total tax burden for higher income workers must 
increase to balance the budget. 
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What will be the effects of  this twist in the net earnings curve?. 
Glearly, this policy should make low-skilled worlt more attractive both 
for the worker and the firm, and should stimulate the employment of 
unskilled workers. Wowever, the price these countries will pay could 
be very high. The policy of twisting the net earnings curve pursued in 
countries like France, Belgium and Italy increases the level of  taxa- 
tion on higher skilled workers. As a result, high-sltilled work is made 
less valuable and therefore less attractive. This shift is likely to have 
grave long run consequences. Most of the job creation potential for 
highly developed economies is located at the higher end of  the skill 
distribution. As a result, continental European countries will increase 
their already significant handicap in creating high-skilled jobs. The net 
employment effect of  the continental European solution of twisting 
the net earnings curve may very wel1 be negative. We conclude that the continental approach to solving the unem- 
ployment problem is based on an illusion, i.e. that one can solve the 
unemployinent problem while keeping the system of income protec- 
tion of workers in place. Contitiental European policy makers con- 
tinue to entertain the fiction that there is a tliird way. This third way 
is one wliere workers can continue to enjoy tlie comfort of stable and 
regulated income. while the government will subsidise the outsiders 
into the job market. In the long run this will force continental Euro- 
pean governments ts  increase their job subsidies when with each mac- 
ro-economic shock, more workers fa11 into the unemployment trap. 
From the analysis of thic paper we distil three conclusions. First, there 
is a responsibility for macro-economic management t0 regulate ag- 
gregate demand. This Keynesian idea has been completely neglected 
in Europe (but not in the US) during the 1990s. This neglect is partly 
responsible for the strong build-up of the unemployment rate in Eu- 
rope during the 1990s. In fact, one can argue that precisely because 
the European supply side is so rigid the responsibility for regulating 
aggregate demand is more important. One can only hope that the fu- 
ture EMU will make it possible to pursue less deflationary demand 
management policies. 
Second, there exist polieies to reduce the unemployrnent trap which 
the income protection schemes have spanned for the low-skilled work- 
ers in Europe. These policies, however, necessarily imply reducing the 
degree of income protection that workers in Europe now receive. Con- 
tinental European policies now start from the proposition that the un- 
employment trap of the low skilled can be eliminated without affect- 
ing the degree of income protection of workers. We have stressed that 
this "third way" can only work if  the government takes over the la- 
bour market of the low-skilled workers. 
Third, if we want to eliminate the unemployinent trap for tlie low- 
skilled workers while maintaining the market system in the labour mar- 
kets, a lot of convincing will have to be done. The elimination of this 
unemployment trap is not only a technica1 problem of  identifying 
whicli rigidities matter and how to remove them. It is indeed relative- 
ly easy to identify those rigidities that harm employment and to pro- 
pose to abolish them. It should be realised that making the labour mar- 
kets more flexible is a euphemism for eliminating or reducing the de- gree of  protection of workers' wages. Phrased in those terms, it be- 
comes clear that it is an intense politica1 problem. European work- 
ers, who today benefit from the lnany protective devices wil1 certainly 
resist and will use their strong political power to oppose changeI3. The 
main political challenge, therefore, is how to convince those that have 
a job that it is also in their long terin interest to have Iess protective 
measures. Failure to do so will inevitablv put Europe on the road to- 
wards increasing unemployment for the low-skilled workers and an 
increasing cal1 on the state to directly intewene in the employment 
process. 
NOTEN 
I. Note tli?.t we hare indicate:!  the period of rcccssions by verticai shaded arcas. Vv'c  have 
also taken thc EU rccessions as the referente. 
2.  See also the recent study of Davcri and Tabellilli (1997) on the iniportance of taxatioii 
of labour. 
3.  Some labour inarltet rigidities also arise because of measures to protect the eì?zplo)~- 
rnelzt of workers. Tlie inost important one here is the job protection legislation (e.g. 
restrictioiis oii firi~ig  workers, high redundaiicy payments). According t« the previous- 
ly cited vmrk of Steve Nickel these protective measures do not seem to affect unem- 
ployment very much, coiitrary to incoine protection measures. 
4.  It also, aild quit inevitably, leads to a thriving "underground econoiny" for unskilled 
labour. 
j.  Note that tliis analysis also explains wliy unskilled iiewcomers in the labour market will 
find it very difficult to climb the ladder and to escape from tlie unemployment trap. 
6. This is not ai1 unreasonable assuinptioil to make. After all, profit maximising firms will 
try to matcli tlia wage cost to tlie productivity of the last worker ernployed. 
7.  Tliis phenon~enon  inay also explain why the econoinetric evidence between explicit min- 
imum wages and unemployment is so  weak. We ofte find that countries wit11 low or non- 
existent ininimum wages have high unemployment. See Card and Krueger (1995). 
8. This has also heel1 tressec! in the insider-outsider niodels proposec! by Lindbeck and 
Siiower (1988). See also Blailchard and Summers (1986). 
9.  According to a recent study of the European Comrnission, budget deficits in the EU- 
countrics have increased on averagc by 3.6 % of GDP during recessions over the pe- 
riod 1961-96. See E~iropeaii  Conimission (1997). 
10.  Thc rate of change of the debt to GDP ratio can be writteil as: 
b, = d, - gb,  (1) 
wherc b, is the debt to GDP ratio in period t, d, is tlie deficit as a perccnt of GDP in 
period t, and g is tlie nomina1 growth rate (assumed to be constant). The stability pact 
now sets a new objective for couiitrics, i.e. that they aim for a balanced budget. This 
mearis that d, = O in (1). As a result we obtain: 
b, = -gb, 
Tlie solutioii of this simple differential equation: 
(2) 
b - c 
1-  (3) 
Tliis shows tliat the debt to GDP ratio inust go to zero as t goes to infinity. 
11. One  could argue that the difference between thc Maastricht budgetary norms and the 
stability pact is ~iot  as pronounced as representcd here. The Maastricht Treaty also stip- 
ulates that countries should aroid "excessivc  deficits"once  they are in EMU. The pro- 
tocol then refers to 3 % as the limit not to be exceeded. Countries failing to avoid ex- 
cessive deficits could be sanctioned. By filling in the detail of these sanctions and tlic exact coiiditioiis under wliich they wil1 apply, tlie stabilip pact lias cei-tainly made these 
Treaty provisions niorc hiiiding. In tl~at  sense. the stability pact represenis a significant 
tighteiiing. 
12. This caii bc seen froni equation (1) iii the previoiis footnote. It the debt/GDP ratio is 
stabilised at tbe Ievcl of 60 7L'  we Sind tliat d = 0.6 g. With a noiiiinal growth rate (g) of 
5 % the hilaastricht deht target of 60 Ci allo\vs couiltries to sct their cizSicits at 3 C'c o11 
average. and still keep this debt target unchniigcil. 
13.  See the iiiteresting work of Saiiit Paiil (1997) on the political cconomy of laboui- rilar- 
ket rigiditics. 
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